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Effect Of Intervening Cause On Duty Owed
Passenger By Carrier
Jones v. Baltimore Transit Co.1
Plaintiff was a passenger on a bus of defendant which
was proceeding in a northerly direction on St. Paul Street
toward the intersection of Preston Street in Baltimore.
Plaintiff testified in the court below that she was standing
near the driver holding on to a rod, since she intended to
get off at Preston Street. She further testified that the speed
of the bus was "very fast" or "a little too fast", and that a
car pulled in front of the bus. This caused the driver to
apply the brakes to avoid a more serious accident. Plaintiff
was thrown against the money box and thereby injured.
The court below directed a verdict for defendant. On plaintiff's appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed.2 The Court
rejected plaintiff's theory that by segregating and relying
on the testimony concerning the speed of the bus, sufficient
negligence might be inferred to at least get the case to the
jury on this point. It was stated that, "[n] egligence may
not be inferred from general adjectival descriptions alone." 3
Several cases are cited to show that negligence must arise
from the facts, not adjectival generalizations.4 To complete the case against plaintiff, it was said that even assuming the speed of the bus was negligence, plaintiff could not
recover, since the act of the car which cut in front of the
bus was a superseding or intervening independent cause.
Thus, any negligence of the bus driver in speeding could
not be the proximate cause of the accident.'
The problem which arises in this decision is twofold,
the intervening cause and the duty of care owed a passenger by a carrier. The latter is the more difficult to reduce
to a legal maxim. In the words of Prosser, "[c] arriers who
accept passengers entrusted to their care must use great
caution to protect them, which has been described as 'the
utmost caution characteristic of very careful prudent men',
or 'the highest care consistent with the nature of the under1211 Md. 423, 127 A. 2d 649 (1956).
3 Ibid. The Court divided the decision into two segments. The first is
outside the scope of this note. The Court discussed the fact that the evidence given by plaintiff was such that the doctrine of res ip8a loquitur
could not apply, since by her own testimony she had shown that a cause
not within the control of defendant might have caused the accident, namely
the car that cut in front of the bus.
IIbid, 428.
Sonneburg v. Monumental Tours, 198 Md. 227, 81 A. 2d 617 (1951);
Charlton Bros. Co. v. Garrettson, 188 Md. 85, 51 A. 2d 642 (1947) ; Baltimore
Transit
Company v. Sun Cab Co., 210 Md. 555, 124 A. 2d 567 (1956).
5
Supra, n. 1, 430.
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taking'."' The Maryland cases seem to accept this definition, with the further proviso that the carrier is not to be
considered an insurer, and thus liable for any injury to a
passenger, but rather the duty should always be counterbalanced by the other obligation that the carrier owes to
its passengers, namely, that of getting them to their destinations quickly and efficiently.7 But this duty which the
carrier owes to its passengers for safe passage is greater
than the duty owed to third persons.' Perhaps it is justifiable to say with Prosser, "[w] hat is required is merely the
conduct of the reasonable man of ordinary prudence under
the circumstances, and . . . the greater responsibility is

merely one of the circumstances, demanding a greater
amount of care" In this light, consider the Court's condemnation of general adjectival descriptions in the instant
case. This approach was reiterated in the recent case of
Smith v. Baltimore Transit Co.,"0 where a refusal to submit
to the jury the question of whether a sudden start was
negligence was affirmed.
The second aspect of the problem, that of the superseding or intervening independent cause is more susceptible
of definition. The Restatement of Torts gives a general
description of an intervening force as "one which actively
operates in producing harm to another after the (original)
actor's (negligent) act of or omission has been committed".' Thus, any act by a third party subsequent in
time to the original actor's act may be thought of as, at
least, a concurring cause of harm. But merely because
there is such a concurring cause present, the original tortfeasor is not relieved of his liability if his act remains the
proximate cause of the harm. 2 The Restatement further
says that a superseding cause is "an act of a third person
or other force which by its intervention prevents the actor
from being liable for harm to another which his antecedent
negligence is a substantialfactor in bringing about"." The
6 PROSSER,

HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS (1941) 256-7.
"Pugh v. Wash. Rwy., Etc., Co., 138 Md. 226, 113 A. 732 (1921) ; Smith
v. Transportation Co., 172 Md. 42, 191 A. 66 (1937) ; Brooks v. Sun Cab
Company, 208 Md. 236, 117 A. 2d 554 (1955) ; Smith v. Baltimore Transit
Co., 211 Md. 529, 128 A. 2d 413 (1957).
'Sun Cab Co. v. Reustle, 172 Md. 494, 192 A. 292 (1937).
'Op. cit., supra, n. 6, 257.
10Supra, n. 7. However, the case went to the jury on the question of the
driver's duty after the collision, and the jury found for the defendant.
11Vol. 2 (1934), §441 (1). Parenthetical material supplied.
12 Holler v. Lowery, 175 Md. 149, 162, 200 A. 353 (1938).
"Op. cit., 8upra, n. 11, §440. Italics supplied. Comment b says:
"A superseding cause relieved the actor from liability, irrespective of
whether his antecedent negligence was or was not a substantial factor
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problem is to distinguish between a concurring cause on
the one hand, and a superseding cause on the other. Several factors may be involved in this characterization. 4 The
spirit of the Restatement provision has been incorporated
into the Maryland law. Perhaps the leading case is Sun Cab
Co. v. Faulkner,5 where there was evidence that defendant's cab was travelling at an excessive speed when it collided with another vehicle proceeding unlawfully through
a red light at a crossing. The Court said, "[i] f negligence
is found in the rate of speed at which the Sun cab was
being driven, that fact alone does not, of course, answer
the question of liability. The negligence must have been
the cause of the collision."'" The Court then found that
the unexpected violation of the traffic signal by the other
car was the real cause of the accident, and therefore there
could be no legal responsibility for the harm on the Sun
Cab's part, and it followed that the passenger could not
recover from the Sun Cab Company. In Monumental Motor
Tours, Inc. v. Becker,17 the Court, citing the Faulkner case
said, "[i] n that case, as in this, the plaintiff was a passenger
of the defendant, but that fact does not prevent the application of the rule that the negligence of which plaintiff complains must be the proximate cause of the injury for which
he sues."' Again, in Belle Isle Cab Co. v. Pruitt,' recovery
in bringing about the harm. Therefore, if in looking back from the
harm and tracing the sequence of events by which it was produced, it
is found that a superseding cause has operated, there is no need of
determining whether the actor's antecedent conduct was or was not a
substantial factor in bringing about the harm."
"Ibid, §442:
"The following considerations are of importance in determining
whether an intervening force is a superseding cause of harm to another:
(a) the fact that its intervention brings about harm different in kind
from that which would otherwise have resulted from the actor's negligence;
(b) the fact that its operation or the consequences thereof appear
after the event to be extraordinary rather than normal in view of the
circumstances existing at the time of its operation;
(c) the fact that the intervening force is operating independently of
any situation created by the actor's negligence, or, on the other hand,
is an act done as a normal response to such a situation;
(d) the fact that the operation of the intervening force is due to a
third person's act or to his failure to act;
(e) the fact that the intervening force is due to an act of a third
person which is wrongful toward the other and as such subjects the
third person to liability to him;
(f) the degree of culpability of a wrongful act of a third person
which sets the intervening force in motion."
163 Md. 477, 163 A. 194 (1932).
Ibid, 479.
"165 Md. 32, 166A. 434 (1933).
Ibid, 35.
187 Md. 174, 49 A. 2d 537 (1946).
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by plaintiff passenger was denied where the Court was unable to find that the speed of the cab contributed to, or was
the proximate cause of the accident.20
The instant case seems to be clearly in line with prior
Maryland decisions which have been concerned with superseding causes and the duty owed a passenger by the carrier.
The primary determination that must be made is whether
the intervening force is in fact superseding. If it is, the
original actor is released from his antecedent negligence.
This effect is perhaps most strikingly seen where the carrier is involved in an accident, and the other party to the
accident, i.e., the intervening force, has violated the Boulevard Stop Law.2 1 In the recent case of Sun Cab Company,
Inc. v. Cusick,22 it was held that where defendant's cab,
straddling the center line, was struck by a car which violated the Boulevard Law, the fact that the cab was "prima
facie'' 21 negligent would not ordinarily be the proximate
cause of the accident. In other words, the negligence of the
driver in violating the Boulevard Law operated to cut off
the prior negligence of defendant toward his passenger.
This result seems clearly justifiable where there was no
indication that the negligence of defendant cab, in driving
to the left of the center line, would have resulted in harm
to plaintiff passenger, except for the intervention of the
intervening force. The cause of plaintiff's injury was the
violation of the Boulevard Law by the third party; probably
10In this line see Koester Bakery Co. v. Poller, etc., 187 Md. 324, 50 A. 2d
234 (1946), where on facts very similar to those of the instant case, the
Court denied recovery, saying at 332:
"The cause of the accident was clearly the unexpected, and unforeseeable, entry of the truck upon the tracks at a point where the collision could not have been avoided even If the street car had been
travelling at a speed of twenty-five miles per hour. Under such circumstances it cannot be inferred that the higher speed assumed was a
contributing cause. . . . [Ilt was held that excessive speed is not a
concurrent cause, where the primary cause is the unforeseeable, negligent act of a third party, and It appears that the accident would have
happened regardless of the excessive speed. Whether a lesser Injury would have resulted from an emergency stop at thirty miles per
hour, than from an emergency stop at forty miles per hour, is a matter
of pure speculation, even if it be assumed that the car could have been
stopped in a shorter distance at the slower speed."
Md. Code (1951) Art. 661/2, §198:
"(Vehicle Entering Through Highway or Stop Intersection.)
(a) The driver of a vehicle shall come to a full stop as required by
this Article at the entrance to a through highway and shall yield the
right of way to other vehicles approaching on said through highway."
209 Md. 354, 121 A. 2d 188 (1956).
Ibid, 360-361, to the effect that the person whose driving to the left of
the center lane in violation of Md. Code (1957 Supp.) Art. 66%, §182,
causes an accident is burdened with proving that his driving to the left
was justified. Accord: Cocco v. Lissau, 202 Md. 1.96, 95 A. 2d 857 (19,3)
and Campbell v. State, 203 Md. 338, 100 A. 2d 798 (1953).
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no accident would have happened had this party not ignored
the stop sign. It would be unjust to hold the carrier liable
for action which normally would have failed to produce
any injury to plaintiff. With the current development of
the Boulevard Law in Maryland which gives the favored
driver an almost absolute right to proceed,2 4 it is believed
that a carrier, in the position of the favored driver with
respect to a third party who has violated a stop sign, will
likely be relieved of any liability to a passenger for its
antecedent negligence.
However, the above theory can not be reduced to an
automatic formula, as the Court pointed out in Sun Cab
Co., Inc. v. Hall.2" There defendant's negligence consisted
of a failure to see a car approaching an intersection because
of inattention on the driver's part. Plaintiff passenger saw
the approaching vehicle, which, though obliged to stop at
the intersection, failed to do so. The cab company was still
held liable to its passenger. The Court found that had the
driver been paying attention, he would have seen the other
car in time to stop and thereby avoid the accident.2 0 Perhaps the result in the Hall case may be reconciled with the
Cusick case, on the theory that the Court is applying an
interpretation of the last clear chance doctrine; that if
defendant's driver had been paying attention, he would
have had the last chance to avoid the accident. But this is
not the usual application of this doctrine.2 More difficult
to reconcile is Valench v. Belle Isle Cab Co.,2" where plaintiff passenger was allowed to recover when defendant cab
started across an intersection upon receiving the green light
without having made sure that the intersection was clear.
17 Md. L. Rev. 68, 73 (1957).
199 Md. 461, 86 A. 2d 914 (1952).
This holding is consistent with the Koester case, supra, n. 20. The
criterion for holding the original actor liable, is that the accident would
have occurred even without the negligent act of a third party. Whereas in
Koester, there was no indication that the speed of the street car would
have caused an accident without the intervention of the truck, in the Hall
case, the driver's inattention could have caused the accident independently
of the car which disobeyed the stop sign.
I This doctrine usually is applied in the contributory negligence field.

See

PRossEa, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS

(1941), 408:

"In nearly all Jurisdictions the strict rules as to the defense of contributory negligence have been modified by the doctrine of last clear
chance. This doctrine, which usually is justified only by vague statements in terms of 'proximate cause,' places its emphasis upon the time
sequence of events, and holds the defendant liable if, immediately prior
to the harm, he has the superior opportunity to avoid it.
"The doctrine Is not recognized by most courts:
d. Where both parties are merely inattentive."
2196 Md. 118, 75 A. 2d 97 (1950), noted, 13 Md. L. Rev. 350 (1953).
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The driver's view was obscured by a streetcar, and the cab
was struck on the blind side by a car that had either run
the light, or had been caught in the intersection when the

light turned red. As was pointed out in the

MARYLAND LAW

viEw 9 the Court's treatment of the case was somewhat

cursory, but the fact remains that the carrier cannot always
depend on being the favored vehicle to relieve it of its duty
to the passenger. The actor may be required to anticipate
and guard against occasional negligence on the part of
others.8 0 But such a standard is so vague that it may hardly
be called a standard at all."'
The essential consideration is to determine whether the
intervening force is concurring or superseding. If it is the
latter, further inquiry becomes unnecessary, since the legal
effect of a superseding cause is to cut off liability for antecedent negligence by the original actor. However, if the
Court finds that the intervening force is only a concurring
cause, the prior negligence of the original actor remains a
contributing factor to plaintiff's injury and liability should
be accordingly affixed. Thus, it is believed that the effect
of an intervening force in a carrier-passenger case is not
essentially different from that in the non-carrier situation.
The standard of care due the passenger is immaterial on
the question of whether the intervening force is to be characterized as superseding or concurring. If the intervening
force is found to be concurring, the Court will apply the
usual standard of care required of a carrier.

J. M.
,Ibid.
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(1934) §302, comment (1):
"The actor is often required to anticipate and provide against that
occasional negligence which is one of the ordinary incidents of human
"
life and is therefore to be anticipated, ...
I Compare the result In the Cusick case, supra, n. 22, with Vadurro v.
Yellow Cab Co. of Camden, 6 N. J. 102, 77 A. 2d 459 (1950), where the
defendant's cab was struck by a station wagon while defendant was over
the center line and was knocked across the opposite traffic lane. While the
cab was in this position, it was struck by another car which ignored warning flares and a police car called to the scene. Some 3 to 5 minutes separated the two accidents, but the Court still held the defendant cab company
liable for the injuries suffered by the plaintiff passengers, since the defendant's wrongful act put the passengers In danger to begin with, and the
causal connection between defendant's negligence and the passengers' injuries was unbroken.
102 RESTATEMENT OF THiE LAW OF TORTS

